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Abstract     This paper aims to examine the influence of private corporations in the tripartite structure of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU): Telecommunications Standardization, Radiocommunication, and Tele-
communications Development. The paper finds that, in the standardization sector, power has been effectively trans-
ferred from nation states to the private corporate sector since the approval process now enables standards to be ap-
proved by members of the study group that developed them, which is essentially the private sector. In the radio-
communication sector, the private sector continues to conduct much of the requisite technical work, but national 
governments are ultimately the decision makers and, further, it is difficult to distinguish between treaty and non-
treaty work. In the development sector, the ITU seeks to create an enabling environment for private investment in 
developing countries and actively seeks to build private sector partnerships. In the long run the ITU may be unable 
to satisfy either its narrow corporate constituency or the vast majority of its developing country members. As the 
United Nations agency which coordinates satellite spacing and allocates access to the electromagnetic spectrum on 
an international basis, the ITU is the world's most prominent international telecommunications institution, so its 
structural modifications and membership changes are of great significance in a world increasingly dependent on a 
global grid of wired and wireless telecommunications networks. 
 
 
 
In accord with the expanded embrace of neolib-
eralism, the reform and privatization of the tele-
communications sector, a policy process which 
diffused rapidly globally throughout the 1990s, 
was accompanied by the restructuring of the 
world's most prominent international telecom-
munications institution, the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU), the United Nations 
agency which coordinates satellite spacing and 
allocates access to the electromagnetic spectrum 
on an international basis. This article examines 
the ways in which the private sector has extended 
its influence in the three sectors of the ITU, 
which correspond to its main areas of activity: 
Telecommunication Standardization (ITU-T), 
Radiocommunication (ITU-R), and Telecommu-
nications Development (ITU-D). The tripartite 
structure is a result of the Additional Plenipoten-
tiary Conference, held in Geneva in 1992, which 
streamlined ITU activities after the Plenipoten-
tiary Conference held in Nice in 1989 initiated an 
evaluation of ITU structures, operations, and re-
sources and embarked on restructuring the organ-
ization to make it more responsive to its mem-
bers in a market-based, privately controlled glob-
al telecommunications environment. 
In conjunction with the structural modifica-
tion of the ITU, its membership base has wit-
nessed change as the organization actively seeks 
to attract more private sector, corporate partici-
pants. Although the ITU is still referred to as an 
inter-governmental organization, since it com-
prises almost all of the world's countries which 
are designated as members who alone retain full 
voting rights, it now encompasses more than 650 
private companies from the telecommunication, 
broadcasting, and information technology sectors 
that are classified as sector members. The 1998 
and 2002 Plenipotentiary Conferences focused 
on strengthening the participation of the private 
sector in the ITU, adopting several resolutions 
enhancing the rights of sector members, as well 
as measures to enable the ITU to match indus-
try's time-frames and operational practices. Pri-
vate sector members were also admitted on a 
provisional basis as observers at Council 2005 
and 2006 sessions. Some contend that such pro-
gress in expanding the rights of the private sector 
has been meager, given the amount of effort ex-
tended over many years to increase their influ-
ence, and many segments of the global telecom-
munications industry, who could provide valua-
ble expertise, still consider participating in the 
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ITU to be irrelevant and unnecessary for expand-
ing their operations as this can be attained 
through bilateral negotiations. Others, however, 
aver that in light of the increased private sector 
participation in ITU activities it is essential that 
the needs of developing countries remain at the 
forefront of the ITU agenda and do not succumb 
to corporate directives. 
Developing countries constitute the majority 
of ITU members and the bulk of the world's pop-
ulace to whom telecommunications services must 
be extended in order to reduce the global dispari-
ty in access to information technologies and ser-
vices. As noted, the ITU enjoys near universal 
membership, but that does not equate to univer-
sal participation. Full participation in ITU fora 
presents a variety of complex impediments for 
many developing counties who lack sufficient 
knowledgeable and experienced staff to articulate 
and successfully lobby, if you will, for their 
needs and for the attainment of equitable man-
agement and development of "common heritage" 
principles as related to space (Vogler, 1995). 
This article thus seeks to assess the various views 
regarding private sector participation in the ITU 
as well as the ramifications of the private partici-
pants on the activities of the ITU's three divisions. 
METHODOLOGIES 
The work of international institutions is one of 
the most influential factors governing our world, 
with decisions generally made by representatives 
of ruling groups, thus its endeavors are biased in 
relation to those in power (Escobar, 1995). As 
Escobar (1995) writes, our knowledge is ideolog-
ical in the sense that the international organiza-
tion's conceptions and means of description rep-
resent the world as it is for those who rule it, ra-
ther than for those who are ruled. The relation-
ship between the two is socially constructed by 
bureaucratic and textual mechanisms that are an-
terior to their interaction, though the interaction 
is presented as "facts", which can be categorized 
by professional discourse and presented in stand-
ardized ways (Escobar, 1995). Ethnomethodolo-
gists contend that institutional texts cannot be 
taken as objective records of external reality, but 
must be understood in relation to institutional 
uses and goals and in the context of their produc-
tion and interpretation (Escobar, 1995). Institu-
tional ethnography thus attempts to discern the 
ways in which institutional procedures shape or 
produce socioeconomic and sociocultural prac-
tices. 
Since this research is interdisciplinary in na-
ture with several contemporary, interrelated is-
sues being examined, methodologically, this 
work attempts to employ institutional ethnogra-
phy in conjunction with the case study, which 
draws upon multiple data sources to investigate a 
specific phenomenon. Multiple sources of evi-
dence are the primary strength of case studies 
since they facilitate the development of converg-
ing lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation. 
This study, which employs economic, political, 
and communication concepts and theories, is 
based on three sources of evidence: documenta-
tion, archival records, and élite interviews. In 
gathering data, field research was conducted at 
the ITU in Geneva in the spring of 2005. Case 
studies are not generalizable to populations or 
universes, but to theoretical propositions, thus 
the goal of the research is to generate analytic 
generalizations regarding telecommunications 
reform and the restructuring of international re-
gimes. 
REGIME ANALYSIS 
The ITU is an international regime concerned 
with space and spectrum, part of our global 
commons, like seas, watercourses, and the at-
mosphere. The military and commercial utiliza-
tion of space does not, however, generate wide-
spread pubic interest or extensive involvement of 
non-governmental organizations as do other en-
vironmental issues. Radio frequencies or satellite 
orbital slots cannot be depleted as can fish stocks 
or minerals, but they are a relatively scarce and 
inordinately valuable resource that engenders 
competition for the best slots and specific fre-
quencies. Furthermore, the use of one particular 
transmitter can impinge on another, thus this in-
terdependency requires international coordina-
tion in order to avoid damaging interference 
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(Vogler, 1995). The ITU, virtually since its in-
ception in 1865 to regulate international telegra-
phy networks, has been concerned with ensuring 
the orderly use of the electronic commons as its 
mandate has gradually expanded with the advent 
of each new technology, from voice telephony to 
communications satellites to the technological 
convergence that defines the present digital, tele-
communications-based information era. The ITU 
can thus be defined as a common property re-
source regime. 
A regime is traditionally defined as a form of 
governance which comprises a set of norms, 
principles, rules and decision-making procedures 
that govern a particular issue area, such as the 
use of the global commons (Vogler, 1995). 
While this work does not intend to delve into the 
theories of international regimes, it is nonetheless 
necessary to differentiate meritorious, but con-
trasting points of view. Neoliberals contend that 
interdependencies and mutual interests conspire 
to promote increased international cooperation. 
Certainly establishing a common property status 
for international space and airspace and creating 
international technical standards reduces the 
transaction costs of conducting commerce. This 
congruence of interest does not, however, deval-
ue the validity of neorealist contentions that mu-
tual interests are not sufficient for regime devel-
opment. Neorealist proponents contend that the 
presence of a dominant state or group of states 
which has the power to impose acceptance of the 
regime and compliance on other states is essen-
tial, because the hegemonic state or grouping 
will only support an international regime if it ac-
quires greater relative gains (Zacher and Sutton, 
1996). 
Indeed, when the USA joined the ITU in 
1932, it was able to extract a number of conces-
sions to its interests in exchange for joining be-
cause many ITU members sought to include the 
American market in the multilateral fold (Drake, 
2000). The USA as well as Canada had not earli-
er joined the predecessor to the ITU, the Interna-
tional Telegraph Union, since it had not wanted 
to nationalize or impose treaty obligations and 
rates on its private carriers. Although private car-
riers were allowed to participate in the adminis-
trative conferences, albeit without voting rights, 
since 1871, these intercontinental undersea cable 
companies were essentially forced to acquiesce 
to the national Post, Telephone, and Telegraph 
(PTT) authorities to secure operating rights. To 
facilitate the participation of countries with pri-
vate carriers, the USA, in agreeing to join the 
ITU, required that the decision-making proce-
dures be amended, and the designation of "rec-
ognized private operating entity" (RPOA) was 
thus developed (Drake, 2000). 
The rights of private companies as sector 
members in the ITU have since gradually 
evolved, in accord with the domestic policies of 
the USA and other dominant states. Writes Lyall 
(1989), "the law of England as applied to mari-
time matters through the Admiralty Court had 
significant impact and became for most purposes 
international maritime law ... History, therefore, 
leads me to suspect that US Law may become 
international space law ... By reason of its tech-
nical skills, its domestic market and its entrepre-
neurial attitudes, the USA is a major leader in 
space matters. That 'lead' may result in much US 
law becoming the language in which problems 
are discussed and solved." Policy differences be-
tween the USA, England, and Japan withstanding, 
each state liberalized basic and non-basic ser-
vices, allowed the interconnection of leased lines 
as well as the reselling of capacity on leased lines, 
and permitted private firms in international cable 
and satellite markets, and in lieu of such changes 
and pressure from these hegemonic powers, the 
ITU officially retracted its restrictions against the 
reselling of leased lines in the early 1990s, which 
in turn enabled the development of competition 
in the traditional PTT market structures (Zacher 
and Sutton, 1996). 
Liberalization of telecommunications as a 
domestic policy also led, at the international lev-
el, to the introduction of trade in services into the 
General Agreement for Tariff and Trade (GATT) 
Uruguay Round 1986-1994. The series of ac-
cords that were approved in April 1994 included 
a General Agreement in Trade in Services 
(GATS) and a Telecommunications Annex. Ad-
herents to these GATT Agreements went on to 
establish within the institutional body of the 
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World Trade Organization (WTO), which effec-
tively succeeded GATT, an Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications and a Reference Paper, 
which placed national regulations in the multilat-
eral arena for the first time. These institutional 
changes support Cowhey's (1990) contentions 
that domestic politics are the primary source of 
regime change as hegemonic players influence 
the change of institutional structures, affect the 
centralization of power in a regime, and alter the 
jurisdiction of the regime vis-à-vis that of an in-
dividual state. 
Vogler (1995), however, states that the exist-
ence of a hegemonic leader is not the distinguish-
ing characteristic of an effective regime, but the 
perception of high levels of mutual vulnerability 
independence. In this regard, it is not considered 
viable for the USA, for example, to leave the 
ITU, as it had UNESCO, due to economic de-
pendence on the vital, global telecommunications 
infrastructure. Cognizance of this position may 
lead to compromise, however, equally arguable 
is that it portends for hegemonic states, notably 
the USA, to strive for greater influence over oth-
er regime members. The interests and activities 
of states and corporations are often indistin-
guishable, and Cox (1987) views the senior offi-
cials of such institutions as forming a transna-
tional managerial class who have created a glob-
ally hegemonic business culture whose interests 
transcend the state-market dichotomy and are 
well represented at the ITU, as evident in the US 
delegation. 
UNITED STATES ITU ASSOCIATION 
Although US delegates to the ITU represent US 
policy, not any particular company or private in-
terest, the fact that all delegates are charged with 
supporting the documentation that is submitted 
by the USA is to a large extent immaterial given 
the crucial role of the private sector in initially 
formulating the policy. The United States ITU 
Association (USITUA) was formed in December 
of 1999 as an open US industry forum for discus-
sion of issues and development of consensus on 
proposals and views on ITU policy matters that 
maximize common benefits to the US industry. 
The trade association seeks to provide the private 
sector with a greater voice as it works toward 
improving ITU processes and improving the US 
preparatory processes. Fundamentally, the 
USITUA seeks to develop greater coordination 
and cooperation between the private sector and 
the US Government to enhance US effectiveness 
in the ITU. The views of USITUA are solicited 
on various issues by the US Department of State, 
the National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration (NTIA), and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), since it is 
recognized as a vital participant in activities of 
the US Government that affects private sector 
interests in ITU-related matters (Rappoport, 
2003). 
It is important to note in this regard that pri-
vate corporations in the USA are legally regarded 
as persons and entitled to the legal rights and 
protections the Constitution affords to an indi-
vidual person in accord with the 1886 Supreme 
Court ruling in the case of Santa Clara County v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company . Corporate 
influence in molding the policies of the FCC as 
well as Congressional legislation, such as the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which enabled 
ever more mergers in the US communications 
industry, cannot be underestimated. Policies are 
largely formed in the USA without public partic-
ipation or public discourse. This model is in es-
sence that which is pursued in the ITU, which 
supports the contentions of neorealists regarding 
the influence of hegemonic states, for, ironically, 
the ITU, while committed to freedom on infor-
mation, classifies its information and thus pro-
hibits public access and input. Information re-
garding ongoing work and meetings in the ITU is 
not publicly available - only to its members. The 
ITU may well be advised to adopt a Freedom of 
Information Act to declassify documents before 
the requisite 20 years. The rhetoric of the ITU 
withstanding, it can claim no direct accountabil-
ity to citizens, though it is committed to the in-
clusion of the corporate class. According to Lee 
(1996), the vast majority of private sector dele-
gates to the Plenipotentiary Conference, the su-
preme organ of the ITU, come from the core 
countries that dominate the global telecommuni-
PRIVATE SECTOR INFLUENCE IN THE ITU  |  PATRICIA McCORMICK 
6!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU  |  2007!
cations market, namely, the USA, the UK, Japan, 
Canada, France and Italy, and, given the decen-
tralized structure of conference proceedings, the 
influence of these delegates far exceed their ac-
tual numbers. 
TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OVERVIEW 
Indeed, 12 of the 28-member panel assigned 
to formulate recommendations for institutional 
reform came from leading private sector tele-
communications and business organizations 
(Geri, 2001). Taverns (2000) writes that the pan-
el members urged that the ITU be transformed 
into a private-public partnership, arguably essen-
tial as its PTT political authority has eroded and 
greater telecommunications deliberations now 
occur in the liberalization-oriented World Trade 
Organization. The panel also suggested that the 
authority and responsibility of the General Secre-
tariat be enhanced and the operations divided 
among the three functional arms be combined, 
though this would remove the discretionary pow-
er accorded each Sector to ascertain its own insti-
tutional responses to its needs and constituents 
(Taverns, 2000). Although this recommendation 
was not adopted, it is clear that the architects of 
the tripartite structure of the ITU lacked the fore-
sight to appreciate the competition and rivalry 
between the Sectors that would ensue. Parkes 
(2000) contends that bitter in-fighting deprived 
ITU Secretary General Utsumi of the senior sup-
port he needed. Indeed, each of the individual 
sector directors vies for the position of Secretary 
General as their terms expire simultaneously. 
Such issues of stability and change have long 
been of concern to regime theorists, and it should 
be noted that the creation of the tripartite struc-
ture and the change of rules and decision-making 
procedures within each of the Sectors of the ITU 
signify the adaptive process of the regime, not 
actual regime change which would entail an al-
teration of norms and principles (Vogler, 1995). 
Reform did not include an alteration of the 
achievement of consensus, nor the creation of 
centralized mechanisms to monitor compliance 
with its instruments. The purposes of the ITU 
have remained essentially unaltered. There has, 
however, been a subtle, but fundamental shift of 
power from nation states, irrespective of their 
voting status in the Union, to transnational cor-
porations. This is in accord with what Geri (2001) 
refers to as the New Public Management, in 
which the state, devoted to securing conditions 
that enable the domination of multinational firms, 
engages in administrative reforms which include 
privatization of state owned enterprises, deregu-
lation, competition in services, and facilitation of 
the role of the private sector in international or-
ganizations. Geri (2001) contends that of all the 
UN specialized agencies, the ITU is under the 
most pressure, due to incessant changes in the 
telecommunications sector and the fear of be-
coming irrelevant in light of these changes, to 
implement substantial reforms strengthening the 
role of non-state stakeholders. 
BUDGET 
Although Geri (2001) states that funding issues 
do not appear to be the driving force for the re-
forms, the ITU has suffered notable financial du-
ress in recent years. Sector members have cer-
tainly assisted in alleviating the ITU's budgetary 
woes, which accounts in part for the organiza-
tion's campaign to recruit private companies to 
become active members and fund its various 
programs. It need be noted, though, that threaten-
ing to reduce one's financial contribution is often 
employed as a means to change an organization, 
or at least as a limited retaliation or demonstrated 
opposition to an organizational decision, as argu-
ably demonstrated by some European firms re-
ducing their ITU contributions when voting 
rights were denied to sector members. 
According to the ITU (2006a), sector mem-
bers contribute 11.6 percent and associate mem-
bers, a more limited class of private company 
participants, contribute 0.6 percent of the overall 
budget. Notably, other forms of private sector 
financial contributions account for a further 15.2 
percent of total funding, namely, cost recovery 
for services such as project execution, satellite 
notifications, and the sale of publications, thus 
raising total private sector contributions to more 
than 27 percent of the ITU budget. It should also 
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be noted that as a group sector members and as-
sociates pay about as much that paid in total by 
approximately 88 percent of the member states, 
and that if a sector member joins all three sectors, 
that sector member pays nearly the amount that 
60 percent of the member states pay. This situa-
tion is attributed to the lower amounts paid by 
developing countries. 
At each Plenipotentiary Conference, each 
member and sector member freely selects its 
class of contribution, from one-sixteenth of a unit 
to 40 units. When the budget is approved, the 
amount of the contributory unit is determined, 
which for the biennium 2006-2007 is set at Swiss 
Francs or CHF 318,000 per unit. The current 
value of one contributory unit for a sector mem-
ber is set at one-fifth of that of a member. Only 
members listed by the UN as least developed 
countries and approved by Council may select 
the one-eighth and one-sixteenth unit classes of 
contribution. Although the contributory unit for 
associates has been fixed at CHF 10,600 for the 
ITU Radiocommunication and Telecommunica-
tion Standardization Sectors, the Development 
Sector is only CHF 3,975 and merely CHF 
1,987.50 for associates from developing coun-
tries ([10] ITU, 2006a). 
MacLean (2003a) recommends that this free-
choice financing scheme of the ITU be replaced 
in order to secure and solidify its financial posi-
tion. Furrer (2000) concurs, stating that the ITU's 
fragile financial position can be strengthened by 
widening the financial base, lowering the con-
tributory unit to make the ITU affordable to a 
wider range of actors, and if necessary, forging 
guidelines on the appropriate level of contribu-
tions to prevent sector members from reducing 
their contribution to the strictest minimum. Since 
member states cannot be restored to their former 
position at the center of global governance, 
MacLean (2003a) contends, reform must entail 
acceptance of plural centers of power, a new coa-
lition of stakeholders with equal rights and obli-
gations. Furrer (2000) argues that sector mem-
bers should be given more decisional power, in-
cluding voting rights, at all levels of ITU activi-
ties, particularly regarding finances and budgets. 
In exchange for being on an equal footing with 
member states within the Finance Committee, 
sector members, writes Furrer (2000), should 
contribute to the ITU's budget on a basis propor-
tionate to their activities and be allowed to allo-
cate financial resources to a specific activity 
within a sector. Furrer (2000) also proposes that 
voting procedures should be introduced and ap-
plied when consensus cannot be reached. 
Enhancing the decision-making rights and fi-
nancial responsibilities of the private sector in 
the ITU has been staunchly advocated by Europe, 
but there is a sharp divergence of opinion regard-
ing the apposite role for the private sector among 
the different member states. Many members, par-
ticularly developing countries, object to the in-
creased involvement and influence of private 
sector interests in ITU decision-making process-
es, though they may be amenable if it correlates 
to greater financial contributions (MacLean, 
2003a). The Arab states, however, have submit-
ted proposals in the ITU-R to clearly delineate 
treaty and non-treaty matters, and to the extent 
possible, exclude the participation of the sector 
members from the treaty-making processes 
(Fisher, 2003), which is in sharp contrast to what 
has transpired in the ITU-T where power has 
been effectively transferred from governments to 
the private sector (Fisher, 2003). Financial pres-
sures have prompted each of the sectors to reas-
sess its working methods and structures to be in-
creasingly efficient, and demarcate the appropri-
ate role for the private sector, which varies sig-
nificantly between the three sectors. 
ITU-T 
In the ITU-T, formerly the International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Consultative Committee 
(CCITT), sector members have come to play an 
equal role with governments in determining the 
agenda for each four-year standardization cycle. 
Study groups of experts from the private sector, 
that is, the leading international telecommunica-
tion organizations, then conduct the technical 
work of developing standards and specifications 
for telecommunications systems, networks and 
services. Arguably in no other international in-
dustry are technical interconnection standards of 
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more importance than in telecommunications 
(Zacher and Sutton, 1996). Until 1989 telecom-
munications equipment standards were approved 
only every four years as recommendations by the 
plenary assemblies of the former CCITT and the 
CCIR (International Radio Consultative Commit-
tee), which was an extremely long time frame 
given the rapid pace of change in this arena. The 
exponential growth and convergence of commu-
nications technology coupled with competition in 
standards setting by regional bodies and private 
sector software developers have served, in part, 
as the impetus for reform of ITU-T (Vogler, 
1995), which, until 2001, required that all stand-
ards be approved by member states before they 
became official, even though most standards 
were developed in study groups comprised of the 
private sector (MacLean, 2003a). 
To help ensure that the ITU's preeminent role 
in this realm was not usurped, the Alternative 
Approval Process (AAP) was then adopted, 
which enables standards to be approved by the 
members of the study group that developed them, 
which is in essence the private sector. Adoption 
of the AAP has reduced the average time-to-
market of ITU-T's recommendations by six 
months, for the traditional approval process aver-
aged about 36.2 weeks, while the AAP is con-
cluded in about 9.4 weeks (Fishman, 2003). 
Some, however, contend that this process is in-
sufficient to curb the ascendance of a diverse 
range of private sector-led standard bodies and 
the ITU may become a mere rubber stamp for the 
outcomes of deliberations within the Global 
Standards Cooperation Group (Zacher and Sutton, 
1996). Regardless of the ITU's ability to retain its 
historical dominance in the standardization pro-
cess, it must be noted that the AAP, which is 
now employed in virtually all Standardization 
Sector study groups, has enabled the ITU-T to 
effectively evade the sovereignty principle, 
which, MacLean (2003a) contends, is no longer 
germane in the current global governance envi-
ronment, and since it is from this principle that 
the ITU institutional framework stems, it is in the 
very framework of the ITU, its legal foundations, 
organizational structures and formal decision-
making procedures, that the fundamental prob-
lems facing the organization lie. 
Indeed many consider the reforms instituted 
in 1992 inadequate, and, in regard to ITU-T, 
there are proposals, many of which originate in 
Europe, to further increase the role of the private 
sector by creating a separate forum, primarily 
governed and financed by private sector mem-
bers, for the development of technical standards 
not involving policy regulatory matters (Fisher, 
2003). Separating technical and regulatory func-
tions has long been a source of debate, though, 
and arguably all decisions have some public pol-
icy implications, so drawing the line between 
those issues in which the industry should have a 
major voice and those left to the regulators is a 
constant source of contention, especially as re-
lates to the ITU-R. 
ITU-R 
The USA does not support proposals to split the 
ITU-T or the ITU-R into separate bodies, as it is 
satisfied with current procedures, and asserts that 
the tripartite structure is sound. Although the 
USA has consistently opposed a broad restructur-
ing of the ITU in a way which would equate to 
member states sharing power on a equal level 
with the private sector, it does seek to retain ex-
tensive private sector participation in conducting 
the vital research concerning the technical char-
acteristics and operational procedures for terres-
trial and space-based wireless services and sys-
tems that serves as a basis for the regulatory de-
cisions made at the ITU-R's World Radiocom-
munication Conferences (WRCs). The work of 
the R-Sector, that is developing the technical 
recommendations and treaty instruments govern-
ing the allocation and use of the radio frequency 
spectrum and related orbital resources, is of seri-
ous consequence to member states and sector 
members alike, though member states are the fi-
nal decision-makers at WRCs, which are now 
held every three years. 
The complex negotiations overseen by the R-
Sector regarding the radio frequency spectrum 
form legally binding agreements embedded in 
the Radio Regulations. It is in part for this reason 
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that the R-Sector has not adopted the Alternative 
Approval Process of the ITU-T, since technical 
recommendations may acquire regulatory status 
by being incorporated into the Radio Regulations 
and most ITU-R questions and recommendations 
are considered to be of an intrinsic policy or reg-
ulatory nature (United States Department of State, 
2003)). In this same vein, the USA does not sup-
port proposals to distinguish between the R-
Sector's treaty and non-treaty work. Indeed, it 
contends such a distinction is not feasible since 
key technical and operational elements of treaty 
instruments cannot be developed, evaluated, and 
decided on independently of the non-treaty tech-
nical underpinnings of the subject matter 
(USITUA, 2005). Thus, sector members, who 
play a pivotal role in coordinating the work of 
the R-Sector with their member states, cannot be 
excluded from the treaty making processes. The 
influence of the private sector in defining its re-
spective member state's policies and proposals as 
part of the preparatory work for a successful 
WRC varies significantly, and is notably weaker 
among developing countries, but it is nonetheless 
of vital importance to have an efficient national 
as well as regional consultation between the pri-
vate sector and the government. 
The approval of ITU-R recommendations es-
sentially comprises two stages, with the adoption 
of a text developed in a working party or task 
group, and then submitted to the member states 
for final approval. In some cases, due to logistics 
and expenses associated with traveling, draft rec-
ommendations prepared by the working parties 
cannot be made available in the working lan-
guages in time for the study group, so to expedite 
the process a single language draft may be em-
ployed, though this may conceivably exclude 
some countries from participating. The document 
is then forwarded at the adoption stage by corre-
spondence when texts in the working languages 
are available. To hasten the process, a new pro-
cedure was developed in 2003 whereby the adop-
tion by the study group and the approval by 
member states are undertaken concurrently by 
correspondence using electronic means of com-
munications (USITUA, 2005). This process, 
while efficient, can prove problematic for devel-
oping countries who cannot often participate in 
the exchange of draft documents since they have 
inconsistent access to the internet. 
ITU-D 
To administer development assistance activities 
and redress the global imbalance of telecommu-
nications services, the Telecommunications De-
velopment Bureau (BDT) was created in 1989. 
The Bureau is financed by the ITU's regular 
budget, a change long resisted, writes Lee (1996), 
by those members who contribute substantially 
to the budget. Indeed, Fisher (2003) notes that 
there is concern among Member states as to 
whether they are receiving full value for the ser-
vices rendered by the D Sector and the funds al-
located to the D Sector, which are approximately 
the same amount as allocated to the R-Sector. 
Some question the appropriateness of develop-
ment activities being in the ITU and suggest that 
other international treaty organizations undertake 
the work. A further consideration is MacLean's 
(2003a) contention that developing countries 
have not made noteworthy gains in the ITU re-
form process and their role in the standardization 
and radiocommunication sectors has not in-
creased significantly as a result of the creation of 
the D Sector. The D Sector was established at the 
same time as the ITU embarked on enlarging the 
rights and obligations of private sector members 
of the ITU, which is indicative of its adherence 
to market-led development. 
The ITU-D fully embraces neoliberal ideolo-
gy as it strives to broker partnerships with the 
private sector with a view to harnessing the 
commercial drive of the telecommunications in-
dustry to address the needs of developing coun-
tries (ITU, 2006b). Within the ITU-D, member 
states, writes Fisher (2003), actively solicit the 
support of the private sector as they recognize 
the need for technical expertise, financial support, 
and educational and training programs, which is 
not forthcoming from governmental sources. As 
traditional sources of international development 
assistance grow increasingly scarce, the ITU-D 
deems it essential that the private industry play a 
catalytic role in promoting strategic partnerships 
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with developing countries. The ITU's role has 
shifted from providing technical assistance to 
advising on a wide range of issues relating to tel-
ecommunications sector reform aimed at creating 
an enabling environment for private investment. 
While this goal assists capitalism's expansion and 
may claim indirect benefits for citizens of devel-
oping countries, it should not be confused with 
development. 
Development emphasizes the orientation of 
production towards basic needs, the orientation 
of distribution of goods and services towards the 
poor majority, the incorporation of a social di-
mension into technological research and innova-
tion, and popular participation in a democratic 
system. The goal of development, that is, the im-
provement of society through strong economic 
growth, accompanied by full employment and 
income distribution favoring the popular classes, 
has not been clearly identified as part of the ITU-
D agenda. Rather, the ITU's promotion of univer-
sal approaches to telecommunications policies in 
conjunction with advocating global principles 
contradicts sustainable, self-reliant development 
which focuses on local participation in defining 
and solving community problems, building on 
the strengths of the society that undertakes it. 
Development of the periphery is not a goal of 
capital's strategies, but the ITU situates the tele-
communications policies it advocates within a 
privatized commercial structure, as it likens mo-
dernity with the private sector in accord with the 
dominant paradigm of development. 
This view of telecommunications and devel-
opment as a win-win situation for developing 
countries and telecommunications service pro-
viders alike is espoused by Toure, the former Di-
rector of the Development Bureau who was 
elected as Secretary-General at the ITU Plenipo-
tentiary Conference in November 2006. Toure 
(2003) writes that "[d]eveloping countries will 
enjoy increased connectivity and thus improved 
access to basic as well as enhanced telecommu-
nications services and applications, while US 
firms will gain market share and earn a reasona-
ble return on investment". He also notes that 
"[t]he FCC's contribution is most valued by us in 
the ITU because their leadership has, in part, en-
couraged the rapid growth of regulatory authori-
ties" (Toure, 2003). Many telecommunications 
functions have been assumed by the private sec-
tor with governments increasingly limiting them-
selves to a regulatory and supervisory role, how-
ever, for the FCC to serve as a model of an inde-
pendent regulatory authority for developing 
countries to emulate is to promote complete 
transnational corporate control of the sector 
globally, for the FCC effectively operates outside 
the light of public attention in the USA and gives 
but lip service to the "public interest," for other-
wise the FCC could not tolerate corporate con-
centration in the eminent broadcasting and tele-
communications industries. US communications 
policies have shifted dramatically from the coun-
try's early years of independence when federal 
subsidies were allocated to newspapers to ensure 
a diversity of perspectives, to the domination of a 
few very large, vertically and horizontally inte-
grated transnational corporations. As McChesney 
(2004) contends, this cartel structure of the me-
dia in the USA coupled with the profit-
maximizing commercial orientation of the com-
munications corporations has depoliticized the 
American public as it utterly undermines the 
press's role as the fourth estate, and the captured 
agency of the FCC is impotent to change this, as 
are most "independent" regulatory agencies in 
developing countries. 
The Regulatory Reform Unit of ITU-D or-
ganizes meetings, workshops and training pro-
grams for national regulators in developing coun-
tries, venues at which the private sector can ad-
vance its influence. For one day of the annual 
Global Symposium for Regulators (GSR), pri-
vate corporations or sector members are invited 
to demonstrate new technological innovations 
and educate regulators in the applications of the 
emerging technologies. Such education is not a 
mere presentation of facts, devoid of regulatory 
context, but arguably spun to meet the market 
aims of the given manufacturer or service pro-
vider. Two days of the GSR are reserved for reg-
ulators and policy-makers, but corporate sector 
members can sponsor coffee breaks, cocktails 
hours, etc. and thereby extend their influence in 
these informal gatherings. 
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Before these global meetings, regional pre-
paratory meetings are held which are now de-
rived in part from regional working parties 
(RWP), which were launched in 2004 and are 
open to all private companies in the information 
and communications sectors in a given region, 
not just ITU sector members. Although only ITU 
sector members can chair the meetings, it does 
give the opportunity for other private companies 
to participate in voicing their concerns and pri-
orities for a given region. The stated objectives, 
for example, of the 2nd Arab regional working 
party meetings in 2005 were "[t]o elaborate, dis-
cuss and consolidate proposals ... [which] should 
identify concrete BDT programs and activities to 
be submitted to WTDC-06 (Doha), for inclusion 
in the next four-year Action Plan. To discuss and 
elaborate proposals by ARWP to improve and 
develop participation of Sector members and the 
private sector in BDT activities and ICT devel-
opment projects" (Toure, 2005). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ITU actively solicits and supports the as-
cendance of private corporate actors within each 
of the three sectors of the organization. In the 
Standardization Sector, power has been effec-
tively transferred from nation states to the private 
corporate sector since the approval process now 
enables standards to be approved by members of 
the study group that developed them, which is 
essentially the private sector. In the Radiocom-
munication Sector, where it is difficult to distin-
guish between treaty and non-treaty work, the 
private sector continues to conduct much of the 
requisite technical work, though national gov-
ernments remain the final arbitrators. In the De-
velopment Sector, the ITU seeks to create an en-
abling environment for private investment in de-
veloping countries as it actively seeks to build 
private sector partnerships. In essence, its orien-
tation to development is aimed at enhancing cor-
porate opportunities for capital accumulation in 
developing countries, which, arguably, is neglect 
of its responsibilities to the global commons. The 
widely held view of the ITU as a value-neutral, 
essentially technical UN specialized agency is 
untenable as its objectives conflict. Over the long 
term, the ITU may prove unable to satisfy either 
its narrow corporate constituency or the vast ma-
jority of their developing country Members (Geri, 
2001). 'Reform' will thus continue to be the ITU 
mantra. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. An article submitted to the Editors-in-Chief of 
Information Technologies and International De-
velopment. A version of it was subsequently 
published as "The quest for inclusive governance 
of global ICTs: lessons from the ITU in the limits 
of national sovereignty, information technologies 
and international development" (MacLean, 
2003b). 
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